Network Neutrality: Classification of Arguments For and Against - Revision history

Andyo: Moved content.

2010-09-17T14:35:01Z

Moved content.

Andyo: Added objections to competition remedy

2010-09-10T02:30:25Z

Added objections to competition remedy

←Older revision		Revision as of 02:30, 10 September 2010
Line 187:		Line 187:
	Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices. Regulations could force incumbents to interconnect and to offer their facilities to competitors for reasonable fees. Such laws and regulations are seen to have played a major role in making high-speed networks widely available in South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands.		Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices. Regulations could force incumbents to interconnect and to offer their facilities to competitors for reasonable fees. Such laws and regulations are seen to have played a major role in making high-speed networks widely available in South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands.

-	If private competition is not robust, the government can fund networks, particularly on a municipal level. A few observers have suggested that users could buy their own fiber, either individually or collectively.	+	If private competition is not robust, the government can fund networks, particularly on a municipal level. A few observers have suggested that users could buy their own fiber, either individually or collectively. Objections include:
		+
		+	* Most areas of the United States already have two competing sources of moderately high bandwidth Internet access (an incumbent phone company and a cable TV company) and other areas have characteristics (such as being sparsely populated or low-income) that discourage investment, even if more competition were present. The incumbents will eventually reach most of the population, if they proceed at a pace that makes business sense, because every business would like more customers.
		+
		+	* Companies with higher bandwidth and better network penetration than the United States have demographic or geographic characteristics that facilitate the build-out of network facilities. For instance, they may have more highly educated and higher-income populations, or be densely populated, or if sparsely populated (such as Canada and Australia) the outlying populations are small enough to handle through subsidies. Therefore, imitating their roads to success might not work in the United States.
		+
		+	* Government-driven solutions are likely to be less efficient than market-driven ones and less agile at evolving.
		+
		+	* The United States may have reached a plateau in the adoption of high-bandwidth networking because many people just don't see a benefit yet to paying for it.
		+
		+	* Related to the previous objection, it's hard to get people to pay a lot for raw networking ability They are more liable to pay for applications they find valuable, which is the argument behind preferential treatment in order to make the applications fund network development.

	= Types of Internet control not covered in this document =		= Types of Internet control not covered in this document =

Andyo: Subheadings for legal remedies

2010-09-09T12:50:19Z

Subheadings for legal remedies

←Older revision		Revision as of 12:50, 9 September 2010
Line 143:		Line 143:
	= Legal remedies =		= Legal remedies =

-	* Complaints about discrimination could be ~~dealt with through laws on competition and monopoly~~, ~~on an individual basis~~, ~~by such bodies as~~ the ~~Federal Communications Commission or Federal Trade Commission~~. ~~Objections to this course of action include:~~	+	These have been proposed by various actors for all varieties of differentiated traffic handling. The effects might be different, however, depending on the variety.

-	** ISPs will be tempted constantly to test the limits of tolerance for discriminatory behavior, and ~~the details of each case will make it hard to develop precedents.~~	+	== Competition and anti-trust law ==

-	** Enforcement of anti-trust laws ~~varies widely from one time period to another~~.	+	Complaints about discrimination could be dealt with through laws on competition and monopoly, on an individual basis, by such bodies as the Federal Communications Commission or Federal Trade Commission. Objections to this course of action include:

-	* ~~"Truth in advertising" laws and regulations could~~ be ~~invoked~~ to ~~require~~ the ~~ISPs to tell customers what kinds~~ of ~~differentiation are in use. See~~ for ~~instance David Farber's offering in~~ the ~~[http://www.thei3p.org/docs/events/WESIINetNeutrality2.pdf Communications~~ of ~~the ACM's Point/Counterpoint Network Neutrality Nuances]~~. ~~Objections include:~~	+	* ISPs will be tempted constantly to test the limits of tolerance for discriminatory behavior, and the details of each case will make it hard to develop precedents.

-	** Some forms of ~~differentiation are used~~ to ~~combat fraud and illegal activity, and depend on secrecy to be effective because the actors will work around any known surveillance~~.	+	* Enforcement of anti-trust laws varies widely from one time period to another.

-	** With limited competition, customers cannot force ISPs to change behavior even if the customers know of and disapprove of differentiation.	+	== Transparency ==

-	** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and ~~then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both~~ the ~~ISP and the majority of its~~ customers are ~~unlikely to see any reason to lift~~ the ~~ban~~.	+	"Truth in advertising" laws and regulations could be invoked to require the ISPs to tell customers what kinds of differentiation are in use. See for instance David Farber's offering in the [http://www.thei3p.org/docs/events/WESIINetNeutrality2.pdf Communications of the ACM's Point/Counterpoint Network Neutrality Nuances]. Objections include:

-	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation ~~chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt~~ to ~~reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service (see for instance [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11crawford.html Susan Crawford's New York Times op-ed])~~, ~~but many people believe Congress must or should~~ be ~~brought in to resolve~~ the ~~question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also~~ known ~~as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress~~. ~~Objections include:~~	+	* Some forms of differentiation are used to combat fraud and illegal activity, and depend on secrecy to be effective because the actors will work around any known surveillance.

-	** Economic grounds, ~~because it would disrupt~~ the ~~business plans cited earlier~~	+	* With limited competition, customers cannot force ISPs to change behavior even if the customers know of and disapprove of differentiation.

-	** Technical grounds, on the ~~belief that regulations tend to overreach their objectives~~ and~~, in this case, would prevent beneficial forms~~ of ~~traffic shaping~~	+	* Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.

-	** Social policy grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.	+	== Common carrier status ==

-	* Congress could ~~institute "structural separation" between companies that offer transport and companies who offer~~ services. ~~This would remove~~ the ~~incentive for companies offering transport~~ to ~~play favorites and privilege some transmissions against others either~~ to ~~promote particular application~~-~~layer services~~ or to ~~suppress services they see as competitive threats to their own services~~. ~~Objections include:~~	+	The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service (see for instance [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11crawford.html Susan Crawford's New York Times op-ed]), but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law.

-	** Because people currently are willing to ~~pay more~~ for ~~applications than for transport, separating them might remove~~ the ~~incentives for transport companies~~ to ~~invest in more lines, new routers, and other improvements~~.	+	Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:

-	** Structural separation would be an even more wrenching economic change than the historic break-up of AT&T, ~~and~~ would ~~thus either be politically unfeasible or cause long-term disruption to telecommunications and~~ the ~~Internet.~~	+	* Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier

-	* Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices.	+	* Technical grounds, on the belief that regulations tend to overreach their objectives and, in this case, would prevent beneficial forms of traffic shaping
		+
		+	* Social policy grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.
		+
		+	== Structural separation ==
		+
		+	Congress could require companies that offer transport (the hardware and protocols for networking) to be separated from the companies who offer application-level services. This would remove the incentive for companies offering transport to play favorites and privilege some transmissions against others either to promote particular application-layer services or to suppress services they see as competitive threats to their own services. Objections include:
		+
		+	* Because people currently are willing to pay more for applications than for transport, separating them might remove the incentives for transport companies to invest in more lines, new routers, and other improvements.
		+
		+	* Structural separation would be an even more wrenching economic change than the historic break-up of AT&T, and would thus either be politically unfeasible or cause long-term disruption to telecommunications and the Internet.
		+
		+	== Promoting competition at the network layer ==
		+
		+	Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices. Regulations could force incumbents to interconnect and to offer their facilities to competitors for reasonable fees. Such laws and regulations are seen to have played a major role in making high-speed networks widely available in South Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands.
		+
		+	If private competition is not robust, the government can fund networks, particularly on a municipal level. A few observers have suggested that users could buy their own fiber, either individually or collectively.

	= Types of Internet control not covered in this document =		= Types of Internet control not covered in this document =

Andyo: Added reference

2010-09-08T20:47:28Z

Added reference

←Older revision		Revision as of 20:47, 8 September 2010
Line 125:		Line 125:
	* Services that people expect to be free of charge are more likely to charge money in the race for preferential treatment by ISPs.		* Services that people expect to be free of charge are more likely to charge money in the race for preferential treatment by ISPs.

-	* Whereas adequate response time (with occasional outages or blips in speed) was taken for granted as part of standard Internet service, it will now require extra payments. Some services that might have been started in a low-cost environment may never be started or may not develop an audience because the innovators cannot afford to provide the response time to which users are accustomed. This concern is related to the first concern in this list. There are questions, however, as to whether preferential delivery can create such large disparities in response time that new services will really be hampered.	+	* Whereas adequate response time (with occasional outages or blips in speed) was taken for granted as part of standard Internet service, it will now require extra payments. Some services that might have been started in a low-cost environment may never be started or may not develop an audience because the innovators cannot afford to provide the response time to which users are accustomed. (See, for instance, the [http://www.freepress.net/files/The_Hidden_Harms_of_Application_Bias.pdf paper on "application bias" by M. Chris Riley and Robb Topolski].) This concern is related to the first concern in this list. There are questions, however, as to whether preferential delivery can create such large disparities in response time that new services will really be hampered.

	* The newly commercialized environment may dry up new services at just the moment when ISPs rely on the growth of new services to make preferential treatment economically successful. As explained in an [http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/net.neutrality.delusions.pdf article by Andrew Odlyzko], current offerings (he focuses on video) will not be enough.		* The newly commercialized environment may dry up new services at just the moment when ISPs rely on the growth of new services to make preferential treatment economically successful. As explained in an [http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/net.neutrality.delusions.pdf article by Andrew Odlyzko], current offerings (he focuses on video) will not be enough.
Line 133:		Line 133:
	== Social policy objections ==		== Social policy objections ==

-	* Because ISPs, as owners of the lines, can decide whom to contract with for preferential service, they get to "pick winners and losers" and will effectively have undue influence over other businesses as well as forms of social interaction.	+	* Because ISPs, as owners of the lines, can decide whom to contract with for preferential service, they get to "pick winners and losers" and will effectively have undue influence over other businesses as well as forms of social interaction. They may use this power to roll out services to which they give preference over other competing companies, a classic abuse of monopoly power.

	* ISPs might use their power to censor sites (by downgrading their service) or turn social and political debate to topics of their preference.		* ISPs might use their power to censor sites (by downgrading their service) or turn social and political debate to topics of their preference.

Andyo: Moral -> social policy

2010-09-08T18:40:36Z

Moral -> social policy

←Older revision		Revision as of 18:40, 8 September 2010
Line 1:		Line 1:
	This page aims to distinguish different arguments and reasoning in the debate around network neutrality, or control over traffic transmission on digital networks. The page was created to disentangle the many arguments, because the people arguing for and against network neutrality use multiple definitions of the term and mix together many arguments on different levels. The purpose of this page is not to air polemics, but to elucidate the various points made for and against various forms of network neutrality.		This page aims to distinguish different arguments and reasoning in the debate around network neutrality, or control over traffic transmission on digital networks. The page was created to disentangle the many arguments, because the people arguing for and against network neutrality use multiple definitions of the term and mix together many arguments on different levels. The purpose of this page is not to air polemics, but to elucidate the various points made for and against various forms of network neutrality.

-	The document treats network neutrality is a business practice, and therefore does not cover related topics such as copyright enforcement, censorship, the move of processing and data to remote servers (often called "into the cloud"), policies of mobile providers toward content and applictions, or surveillance. Essentially, the document covers a public issue that started as a set of economic concerns and has been invested by debaters with ~~moral~~ concerns.	+	The document treats network neutrality is a business practice, and therefore does not cover related topics such as copyright enforcement, censorship, the move of processing and data to remote servers (often called "into the cloud"), policies of mobile providers toward content and applictions, or surveillance. Essentially, the document covers a public issue that started as a set of economic concerns and has been invested by debaters with social policy concerns.

	= Varieties of intervention in Internet traffic =		= Varieties of intervention in Internet traffic =
Line 131:		Line 131:
	* Promising a particular Quality of Service is difficult because activity further downstream (among the other organizations carrying traffic from the ISP to other parts of the Internet) has effects on packet transmission. Differentiation on one end, in particular, has effects on the other end. Thus, ISPs may find it hard to provide reasonable contracts for differentiated service that can be monitored and enforced.		* Promising a particular Quality of Service is difficult because activity further downstream (among the other organizations carrying traffic from the ISP to other parts of the Internet) has effects on packet transmission. Differentiation on one end, in particular, has effects on the other end. Thus, ISPs may find it hard to provide reasonable contracts for differentiated service that can be monitored and enforced.

-	== ~~Moral~~ objections ==	+	== Social policy objections ==

	* Because ISPs, as owners of the lines, can decide whom to contract with for preferential service, they get to "pick winners and losers" and will effectively have undue influence over other businesses as well as forms of social interaction.		* Because ISPs, as owners of the lines, can decide whom to contract with for preferential service, they get to "pick winners and losers" and will effectively have undue influence over other businesses as well as forms of social interaction.
Line 163:		Line 163:
	** Technical grounds, on the belief that regulations tend to overreach their objectives and, in this case, would prevent beneficial forms of traffic shaping		** Technical grounds, on the belief that regulations tend to overreach their objectives and, in this case, would prevent beneficial forms of traffic shaping

-	** ~~Moral~~ grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.	+	** Social policy grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.

	* Congress could institute "structural separation" between companies that offer transport and companies who offer services. This would remove the incentive for companies offering transport to play favorites and privilege some transmissions against others either to promote particular application-layer services or to suppress services they see as competitive threats to their own services. Objections include:		* Congress could institute "structural separation" between companies that offer transport and companies who offer services. This would remove the incentive for companies offering transport to play favorites and privilege some transmissions against others either to promote particular application-layer services or to suppress services they see as competitive threats to their own services. Objections include:

Andyo: Paren

2010-09-08T17:55:17Z

Paren

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:55, 8 September 2010
Line 157:		Line 157:
	** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.		** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.

-	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service (see for instance [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11crawford.html Susan Crawford's New York Times op-ed], but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:	+	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service (see for instance [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11crawford.html Susan Crawford's New York Times op-ed]), but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:

	** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier		** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier

Andyo: Added reference

2010-09-08T17:54:17Z

Added reference

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:54, 8 September 2010
Line 157:		Line 157:
	** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.		** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.

-	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service, but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:	+	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service (see for instance [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/opinion/11crawford.html Susan Crawford's New York Times op-ed], but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:

	** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier		** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier

Andyo: Added reference

2010-09-08T17:47:13Z

Added reference

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:47, 8 September 2010
Line 149:		Line 149:
	** Enforcement of anti-trust laws varies widely from one time period to another.		** Enforcement of anti-trust laws varies widely from one time period to another.

-	* "Truth in advertising" laws and regulations could be invoked to require the ISPs to tell customers what kinds of differentiation are in use. Objections include:	+	* "Truth in advertising" laws and regulations could be invoked to require the ISPs to tell customers what kinds of differentiation are in use. See for instance David Farber's offering in the [http://www.thei3p.org/docs/events/WESIINetNeutrality2.pdf Communications of the ACM's Point/Counterpoint Network Neutrality Nuances]. Objections include:

	** Some forms of differentiation are used to combat fraud and illegal activity, and depend on secrecy to be effective because the actors will work around any known surveillance.		** Some forms of differentiation are used to combat fraud and illegal activity, and depend on secrecy to be effective because the actors will work around any known surveillance.

Andyo: Added FIFO

2010-09-08T17:10:23Z

Added FIFO

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:10, 8 September 2010
Line 157:		Line 157:
	** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.		** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.

-	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service, but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:	+	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service, but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, also known as "first-in-first-out" treatment, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:

	** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier		** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier

Andyo: Remedies

2010-09-08T17:06:29Z

Remedies

←Older revision		Revision as of 17:06, 8 September 2010
Line 123:		Line 123:
	* Providing preferred delivery to customers who pay extra is a policy that rests on, and reinforces, an assumption that valuable services can afford to pay for their delivery. Privilege is given to services provided by well-established and well-endowed organizations, services who can draw substantial funding, or services that can persuade new users to pay a premium.		* Providing preferred delivery to customers who pay extra is a policy that rests on, and reinforces, an assumption that valuable services can afford to pay for their delivery. Privilege is given to services provided by well-established and well-endowed organizations, services who can draw substantial funding, or services that can persuade new users to pay a premium.

-	* Services are more likely to charge money in the race for preferential treatment by ISPs.	+	* Services that people expect to be free of charge are more likely to charge money in the race for preferential treatment by ISPs.

	* Whereas adequate response time (with occasional outages or blips in speed) was taken for granted as part of standard Internet service, it will now require extra payments. Some services that might have been started in a low-cost environment may never be started or may not develop an audience because the innovators cannot afford to provide the response time to which users are accustomed. This concern is related to the first concern in this list. There are questions, however, as to whether preferential delivery can create such large disparities in response time that new services will really be hampered.		* Whereas adequate response time (with occasional outages or blips in speed) was taken for granted as part of standard Internet service, it will now require extra payments. Some services that might have been started in a low-cost environment may never be started or may not develop an audience because the innovators cannot afford to provide the response time to which users are accustomed. This concern is related to the first concern in this list. There are questions, however, as to whether preferential delivery can create such large disparities in response time that new services will really be hampered.
		+
		+	* The newly commercialized environment may dry up new services at just the moment when ISPs rely on the growth of new services to make preferential treatment economically successful. As explained in an [http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/net.neutrality.delusions.pdf article by Andrew Odlyzko], current offerings (he focuses on video) will not be enough.

	* Promising a particular Quality of Service is difficult because activity further downstream (among the other organizations carrying traffic from the ISP to other parts of the Internet) has effects on packet transmission. Differentiation on one end, in particular, has effects on the other end. Thus, ISPs may find it hard to provide reasonable contracts for differentiated service that can be monitored and enforced.		* Promising a particular Quality of Service is difficult because activity further downstream (among the other organizations carrying traffic from the ISP to other parts of the Internet) has effects on packet transmission. Differentiation on one end, in particular, has effects on the other end. Thus, ISPs may find it hard to provide reasonable contracts for differentiated service that can be monitored and enforced.
Line 155:		Line 157:
	** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.		** Most new uses of networks start with a tiny cohort of users and then spread if they prove valuable. But if a new use runs up against an ISP ban, both the ISP and the majority of its customers are unlikely to see any reason to lift the ban.

-	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service, but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Objections include:	+	* The FCC could require ISPs to act as common carriers toward services above them. A federal appeals court ruled in April 2010 that the FCC (in a suit brought by Comcast) lacked the authority to require this neutrality. The suit concerned blocking service through traffic analysis, but applies equally to any form of differentiation chosen by an ISP. The FCC could attempt to reassert authority by reclassifying Internet service, but many people believe Congress must or should be brought in to resolve the question through law. Essentially, common carrier status would require every bit to be treated equally, with possible exceptions for classes of traffic that the government has a reason to suppress. Objections include:

	** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier		** Economic grounds, because it would disrupt the business plans cited earlier
Line 163:		Line 165:
	** Moral grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.		** Moral grounds, on the basis that ISPs should be allowed to contract in any manner they desire with their customers and that regulation would constrain customer choice as well as ISP choice. The argument is that customers will choose competitors if ISPs abuse their control.

-	* Congress could ~~require common carrier status~~ for ~~ISPs~~.	+	* Congress could institute "structural separation" between companies that offer transport and companies who offer services. This would remove the incentive for companies offering transport to play favorites and privilege some transmissions against others either to promote particular application-layer services or to suppress services they see as competitive threats to their own services. Objections include:
		+
		+	** Because people currently are willing to pay more for applications than for transport, separating them might remove the incentives for transport companies to invest in more lines, new routers, and other improvements.
		+
		+	** Structural separation would be an even more wrenching economic change than the historic break-up of AT&T, and would thus either be politically unfeasible or cause long-term disruption to telecommunications and the Internet.

	* Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices.		* Competition could provide alternatives to customers, who could then leave ISPs who try to control their choices.