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		<title>Beautiful Trade/3-D Secure - Revision history</title>
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		<description>Revision history for this page on the wiki</description>
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			<title>Ebellis: New page: '''3-D Secure'''   3-D Secure is an XML-based protocol created by Visa to authenticate the consumer to the card.  Visa, MasterCard, and JCB International have adopted the protocol under th...</title>
			<link>http://commons.oreilly.com/wiki/index.php?title=Beautiful_Trade/3-D_Secure&amp;diff=24535&amp;oldid=prev</link>
			<description>&lt;p&gt;New page: '''3-D Secure'''   3-D Secure is an XML-based protocol created by Visa to authenticate the consumer to the card.  Visa, MasterCard, and JCB International have adopted the protocol under th...&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;'''3-D Secure''' &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3-D Secure is an XML-based protocol created by Visa to authenticate the consumer to the card. &lt;br /&gt;
Visa, MasterCard, and JCB International have adopted the protocol under the names Verified &lt;br /&gt;
by Visa, MasterCard SecureCode, and J/Secure, respectively. &lt;br /&gt;
3-D Secure transactions &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
The name 3-D Secure refers to the three domains involved in the security model. The first &lt;br /&gt;
domain, the acquirer, is essentially the e-commerce merchant or acquiring bank. A merchant, &lt;br /&gt;
using compliant software, makes a call to the issuing bank (the second domain, or issuer) to &lt;br /&gt;
verify that the account holder (the third domain) is enrolled in the 3-D Secure card program. &lt;br /&gt;
If the cardholder is enrolled, the issuing bank collects a PIN or password directly from the &lt;br /&gt;
account holder via a frame on the merchant’s web page. This authentication protocol is &lt;br /&gt;
transmitted in an XML document over Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). The SSL ensures &lt;br /&gt;
confidentiality of the account holder’s PIN or password and the authenticity of both the host &lt;br /&gt;
and client. At the same time, the PIN or password is not available to the merchant or acquiring &lt;br /&gt;
bank, keeping this data confidential to only the account holder and her issuing bank. The &lt;br /&gt;
procedure, while complex to describe, is a familiar third-party trust scenario: &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
1. The shopper connects to a merchant’s site, makes a purchase selection, and enters card &lt;br /&gt;
details. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
2. The Merchant Server Plug-in (MPI) sends the Primary Account Number (PAN) to the &lt;br /&gt;
Directory Server. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3. The Directory Server queries the appropriate Access Control Server (ACS) to determine &lt;br /&gt;
whether authentication (or proof of an authentication attempt) is available for the Primary &lt;br /&gt;
Account Number. &lt;br /&gt;
If no appropriate Access Control Server is available, the Directory Server creates a response &lt;br /&gt;
for the MPI and processing continues with step 5. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
4. The Access Control Server responds to the Directory Server. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
5. The Directory Server forwards the Access Control Server response (or its own) to the MPI. &lt;br /&gt;
If neither authentication nor a proof of authentication attempt is available, 3-D Secure &lt;br /&gt;
processing ends, and the merchant, acquirer, or payment processor may submit a &lt;br /&gt;
traditional authorization request, if desired. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
6. The MPI sends a Payer Authentication Request (PAR) to the Access Control Server. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
7. The Access Control Server receives the Payer Authentication Request. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
8. The Access Control Server authenticates the shopper using processes applicable to the &lt;br /&gt;
Primary Account Number (PAN), which may involve a password, chip, PIN, etc. &lt;br /&gt;
Alternatively, the Access Control Server may produce a proof of authentication attempt. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
9. The Access Control Server then formats the Payer Authentication Response message with &lt;br /&gt;
appropriate values and signs it. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
10. The Access Control Server returns the Payer Authentication Response to the MPI in order &lt;br /&gt;
to cache the response for use in further transactions. &lt;br /&gt;
The Access Control Server can send selected data to an Authentication History Server &lt;br /&gt;
(AHS). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
11. The MPI receives the Payer Authentication Response. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
12. The MPI validates the Payer Authentication Response signature (either by performing the &lt;br /&gt;
validation itself or by passing the message to a separate Validation Server). &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
13. The merchant proceeds with an authorization exchange with the acquirer. &lt;br /&gt;
Following step 13, the acquirer processes the authorization with the issuer via an authorization &lt;br /&gt;
system such as VisaNet, and then returns the results to the merchant. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
'''Evaluation of 3-D Secure''' &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
3-D Secure has some nice features for authenticating the user to the account, as well as due &lt;br /&gt;
diligence on the merchant side to ensure it is registered with the card brands; uses compliant &lt;br /&gt;
payment software; and maintains an active, legitimate merchant account with an acquiring &lt;br /&gt;
bank. But it has proven unwieldy in practice. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Phishing concerns have been a persistent issue with 3-D Secure. On the one hand, some &lt;br /&gt;
phishers mimic its behavior. On the other hand, some users reject authentic 3-D Secure &lt;br /&gt;
transactions as phishing attempts. This has to do with the somewhat out-of-band nature of the &lt;br /&gt;
PIN authentication, since the request is coming from a different domain than the merchant, &lt;br /&gt;
and the fact that the issuing bank and the DNS name may not be recognized by the consumer. &lt;br /&gt;
A more fundamental security problem in 3-D Secure is that, just like the CV2 number described &lt;br /&gt;
in the previous section, it is not mandatory for all transactions. So the customer’s account &lt;br /&gt;
number is still a valuable shared secret. All of the same precautions must go into protecting &lt;br /&gt;
the Primary Account Number as it makes its way through the various merchant, payment, and &lt;br /&gt;
supplier systems. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Precertification requires a notable overhead in setting up the protocol between the merchant, &lt;br /&gt;
the bank, and the consumer. Although the overhead is significantly less than what we will see &lt;br /&gt;
in our analysis of the SET protocol in the next section, it’s still not ideal. &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Beyond the phishing complaint of some 3-D Secure consumers lies a liability issue. The card &lt;br /&gt;
brands that support 3-D Secure have stated they will not hold merchants liable for fraudulent &lt;br /&gt;
transactions run through 3-D Secure. This is a great incentive for the merchant to implement &lt;br /&gt;
3-D Secure, but moves the requirement of proof of a fraudulent transaction to the consumer, &lt;br /&gt;
an area where the consumer previously had little liability. Since 3-D Secure is not foolproof, &lt;br /&gt;
this may not go over very well with cardholders. It essentially places blame for a successful &lt;br /&gt;
phishing attack on the victim.&lt;/div&gt;</description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2009 02:19:49 GMT</pubDate>			<dc:creator>Ebellis</dc:creator>			<comments>http://commons.oreilly.com/wiki/index.php/Talk:Beautiful_Trade/3-D_Secure</comments>		</item>
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